Judicial discretion to exclude evidence in terms of s35(5) of the Constitution: S v Hena 2006 2 SACR 33 (SE) by de, Vos Wouter
Judicial discretion to exclude 
evidence in terms of  s 35(5) of  the 
constitution: S v Hena 2006 (2) 
SAcR 33 (SE)
WOUTER DE VOS 
University of Cape Town
1 Introduction
In this case the court was called upon to exclude certain evidence 
against one of the accused in terms of s 35(5) of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, 1996. This section provides as follows:
‘Evidence obtained in a manner that violates any right in the Bill of Rights 
must be excluded if the admission of that evidence would render the trial 
unfair or otherwise be detrimental to the administration of justice.’
It will be apposite, before discussing the present case, to do a brief 
analysis of s 35(5) and to refer to s 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms, upon which the former section appears to be 
modelled (Steytler Constitutional Criminal Procedure (1998) 34; S v 
Naidoo 1998 1 SACR 479 (N) at 527g).
2 Analysis of s 35(5) of the Constitution
It is evident from the wording of s 35(5) of the Constitution (‘evidence 
… must be excluded …’) that it places a duty upon the court to exclude 
evidence which has been obtained in a manner that violates any con-
stitutional right. However, this duty is only activated if the admission of 
the unconstitutionally obtained evidence would render the trial unfair 
or would otherwise be detrimental to the administration of justice. It 
seems equally clear that the court is also endowed with discretion to 
determine if one of the two stated consequences would ensue if the 
said evidence were to be admitted. Schwikkard and Van der Merwe 




       
‘There is a duty to exclude if admission would have one of the consequences 
identified in the section. In this respect there is no discretion but a fixed 
constitutional rule of exclusion. However, in determining whether admission 
would have one of the two identified consequences a court is required to 
make a value judgement and in this respect there is a discretion which must, 
obviously, be exercised having regard to all the facts of the case, fair trial 
principles and, where appropriate, considerations of public policy.’ (Princip-
les of Evidence 3 ed (2009) 215)
3 Section 24(2) of the Canadian Charter
Section 24(2) of the Canadian Charter provides as follows:
‘Where … a court concludes that evidence was obtained in a manner that 
infringed or denied any rights or freedoms guaranteed by this Charter, the 
evidence shall be excluded if it is established that, having regard to all the 
circumstances, the admission of it in the proceedings would bring the admin-
istration of justice into disrepute.’ (cited in Principles of Evidence 201).
It seems clear from the wording of this provision (‘shall be excluded’) 
that it also places a duty on the court to exclude evidence obtained 
in violation of any right enshrined in the Charter. However, this duty 
only arises in the event of the court making a finding that admission of 
such evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute. 
In Regina v Collins it was stated that ‘[s]ection 24(2) does not confer 
a discretion on the judge but a duty to admit or exclude as a result 
of his finding’ (1987 28 CRR (SCC) 122 130). However, it is clear that, 
in coming to its finding in this regard, the court is also called upon 
to make a value judgment, having taken all the circumstances into 
account. In this process the court employs the test of the reasonable 
person:
‘Would the admission of the evidence bring the administration of justice into 
disrepute in the eyes of the reasonable man, dispassionate and fully apprised 
of the circumstances of the case?’ (at 136).
In determining this issue the judge is directed by s 24(2) to have regard 
to ‘all the circumstances’. This means that the court must consider and 
balance a range of factors. In Regina v Collins the court grouped these 
factors under three headings, viz;
(i) Factors that are ‘relevant in determining the effect of the admis-
sion of the evidence on the fairness of the trial’;
(ii) Factors that are ‘relevant to the seriousness of the Charter violation 
and thus to the disrepute that will result from judicial acceptance 
of evidence obtained through that violation’; and
(iii) Factors that ‘relate to the effect of excluding the evidence. The 
question … is whether the system’s repute will be better served 
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by the admission or the exclusion of the evidence …’ (at 137-9; 
see also R v Burlingham 1995 28 CRR (SCC) 244; and Principles 
of Evidence 201-5).
In deciding the issues listed above and determining whether admis-
sion of the tainted evidence would bring the administration of justice 
into disrepute, the court is required to make a value judgment, which 
clearly means that it exercises discretion.
4  Comparison of s 35(5) of the Constitution and s 24(2) of 
the Charter
The similarities between s 24(2) of the Canadian Charter and s 35(5) 
of the Constitution are evident. Both sections place a duty on the court 
to exclude the tainted evidence, if its admission would have the stated 
effect, and both use the administration of justice as the broad criterion. 
However, there are also differences between these sections which are 
worthy of note. Schwikkard and Van der Merwe give the following 
summary of the main differences:
‘[S] 35(5) makes specific reference to a fair trial, whereas s 24(2) does not 
(and [it] had to be read into s 24(2) by the Supreme Court of Canada…); 
s 35(5) uses the criterion ‘detrimental to the administration of justice’, 
whereas s 24(2) created the criterion ‘bringing the administration of justice 
into disrepute’ which, it is submitted, is a broader test than ‘detrimental to 
the administration of justice’ …; the words ‘if it is established that’ in s 24(2) 
do not appear in s 35(5) …’ the words ‘having regard to all the circumstances’ 
appear in s 24(2) but not in s 35(5) — a difference which is of no conse-
quence as a court which interprets and applies s 35(5) must of necessity take 
into account all the circumstances.’ (Principles of Evidence 214 n231; see also 
S v Pillay 2004 2 SACR 419 (SCA) at para 93).
The wording of s 35(5) of the Constitution (‘or otherwise’) makes it 
clear that the consequence ‘detrimental to the administration of justice’, 
constitutes a broad criterion under which the other consequence, ‘unfair 
trial’, must be accommodated. In other words, if admission of evidence 
would render the trial unfair, it would inevitably be detrimental to the 
administration of justice. However, if admission of the evidence would 
not render the trial unfair, it might be necessary nevertheless to exclude 
the evidence on the basis that admission would be detrimental to the 
administration of justice. In brief, whereas admission that would lead 
to an unfair trial would always be detrimental to the administration of 
justice, the reverse is not true. It is possible that admission would not 
result in an unfair trial but would be detrimental to the administration 
of justice (see Schwikkard & Van der Merwe Principles of Evidence 
215-216; S v Tandwa (2008) 1 SACR 613 (SCA) at para 116).
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Against this background the facts and reasoning of the court in 
Hena’s case can now be considered.
5 Hena’s case — facts and reasoning of the court
5.1 Facts
Two men out of a gang of three were charged with two counts of rape 
and one of robbery with aggravating circumstances. Both pleaded not 
guilty. Accused 2 was linked to the rape of each complainant by means 
of DNA evidence, but such evidence was lacking in the case of accused 
1. The case against accused 1 was based on the ‘doctrine of recent 
possession’ (at 37g). The state alleged that accused 1 was in possession 
of the cell phone that was stolen from one of the complainants shortly 
after the crimes had been committed. According to the state the only 
inference that could be drawn from such possession was that accused 
1 was one of the three men who had stolen the cell phone and thus 
also one of the three men who had raped the complainants.
In order to prove its case the state presented the following evidence. 
The complainant in one of the rape counts testified that she had re-
ceived information about a cell phone having been sold by a person 
who lived at a certain address. In accordance with advice received 
from the investigating officer she had passed on this information to 
one Somya, a member of the local anti-crime committee. Thereafter 
both complainants had accompanied Somya and other members of the 
anti-crime committee to the said address. There they had found accused 
1. Against his will he was put in the boot of their vehicle and taken to 
the rudimentary ‘office’ of the anti-crime committee. Because accused 
1 ‘did not want to tell the truth’, according to the complainant, he 
was held there for a long time, during which he was interrogated and 
assaulted by members of this committee. As a result of the information 
eventually supplied by accused 1, the members of the anti-crime com-
mittee, the complainants and accused 1 (again in the boot of the car) 
went to a certain place where accused 1 pointed out one Lucas. The 
latter then handed over a purple cell phone to the complainant, who 
identified it as her property. Thereafter accused 1 was handed over to 
the police. Lucas confirmed the complainant’s evidence regarding the 
handing over of the cell phone to her. He further testified that accused 
1, 2 and a third man had approached him a while ago with the said 
cell phone with the view to selling it. Lucas said that he had taken it 
and kept it, without paying any money. He suspected that it had been 
stolen and wanted to keep it for its owner. The investigating officer 
also testified and explained to the court that there was a working re-
lationship between the police and the anti-crime committee, in terms 
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of which the latter assisted the police with the investigating of crime. 
Accused 1 did not testify in his own defence.
The defence objected to the admission of Lucas’ evidence on the 
basis that it was derived from evidence that had been obtained in 
an unconstitutional manner. The court decided this issue without 
holding a trial-within-a-trial because the parties agreed that it could be 
dealt with in argument and also because the facts in this regard were 
common cause.
5.2 Reasoning of the court
Plasket J stated at the outset that the issue before him raised ‘most im-
portant questions of how courts should maintain the balance between 
“on the one hand, the public interest in bringing criminals to book 
and, on the other, the equally great public interest in ensuring that 
justice is manifestly done to all, even those suspected of conduct which 
would put them beyond the pale”’ (at 39g, referring to Key v Attorney-
General, Cape Provincial Division 1996 (2) SACR 113 (CC)). The judge 
proceeded to remark that it was clear that the information supplied 
by accused 1, as a result of his abduction, interrogation and assault by 
the anti-crime committee, constituted evidence obtained in violation 
of his constitutional ‘right to freedom and security as a person’ (s 12 
of the Constitution). The police had also acted in an unconstitutional 
manner by delegating part of their investigating duty to the anti-crime 
committee, thereby allowing it ‘to assume policing functions’ (at 40). 
Plasket J further stated that there was a clear link between the tainted 
evidence obtained from accused 1 and the evidence of Lucas. Accord-
ing to the judge the evidence established that, ‘but for the violation of 
the fundamental rights of accused 1, the existence of Lucas would have 
been unknown to the State’ (at 40d).
In view of the aforegoing considerations Plasket J concluded that the 
evidence of Lucas, which was clearly derived from evidence obtained 
in violation of accused 1’s constitutional rights, was also unconsti-
tutionally obtained. In the words of the Judge, ‘[i]t was the fruit of 
a poisoned tree’ (at 40i). After referring to a passage in Schwikkard 
and Van der Merwe (Principles of Evidence para 12 8 4), dealing with 
unconstitutionally obtained evidence by private individuals, the judge 
made the following statement:
‘I take the view on the facts before me that, subject to my discretion to 
nonetheless admit the evidence of Lucas, to which I shall return, the admis-
sion of his unconstitutionally obtained evidence is detrimental to the admin-
istration of justice. I turn now to consider whether, notwithstanding this 
conclusion, I should nonetheless admit that evidence in my discretion.’ (at 
41b-c; my emphasis).
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Before commenting on the italicised phrases, it will be convenient 
to mention the factors that the court took into account in deciding this 
issue.
(i) A factor that weighed heavily against the admission of the tainted 
evidence was the unlawful conduct of the anti-crime committee. 
This was clearly evidence of bad faith on their part. In ‘sub-con-
tracting’ their investigative functions to this committee, the police 
also acted in violation of their constitutional duties. In the words 
of Plasket J, it was an ‘abdication of responsibility’ (at 42).
(ii) The violation of accused 1’s constitutional rights was serious in 
this case. It was not a mere ‘technical infringement or the omission 
of a procedural step, but [was a] deliberate infliction of physi-
cal violence and pain on him in order to force him to implicate 
himself against his will …’ (at 42d-e).
(ii) There were lawful means available to the police to obtain the 
evidence of Lucas. They just had to investigate the case themselves 
in a lawful manner.
(iv) There was no evidence showing that the evidence of Lucas would 
inevitably have been discovered.
According to Plasket J these factors all weigh against admissibility of 
the tainted evidence. He, therefore, concluded as follows:
‘I accordingly find that the admission of the evidence of Lucas would be det-
rimental to the administration of justice and that no basis exists for admit-
ting it nonetheless. I thus hold that the evidence is inadmissible.’ (at 42i; my 
emphasis).
The result was that, since there was no admissible evidence linking 
accused 1 with the crimes, he was acquitted.
5.3 Critical analysis
Against this background it will now be apposite to consider the rea-
soning of Plasket J, as reflected in the italicised phrases above. It is 
submitted, with respect, that the judge misconstrued the discretion 
conferred upon the court by s 35(5) of the Constitution. The judge’s 
line of reasoning appears to be that since the evidence of Lucas was 
derived from evidence that was unconstitutionally obtained from 
accused 1, it (Lucas’ evidence) was also unconstitutionally obtained. 
This led Plasket J, without further ado, to the finding that admission of 
Lucas’ evidence would be detrimental to the administration of justice. 
However, the judge made this finding subject to his discretion to no-
netheless admit the evidence of Lucas. Thereafter Plasket J considered 
the relevant factors mentioned above and held that admission of Lucas’ 
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evidence would be detrimental to the administration of justice and that 
there was no basis to admit it nonetheless.
It seems clear from the italicised phrases that Plasket J was of the 
view that once he had made a finding that admission of the tainted evi-
dence would be detrimental to the administration of justice, he still had 
discretion, taking into account the said factors, to admit the evidence. 
This reasoning is, with respect, clearly wrong. The wording of s 35(5) 
makes it abundantly clear that once the court has made a finding that 
admission of the unconstitutionally obtained evidence would render 
the trial unfair or otherwise be detrimental to the administration of 
justice, there is no further room for discretion. There is then a duty 
on the court to exclude the evidence. Plasket J, therefore, erred in 
first making a finding that admission of the tainted evidence would 
be detrimental to the administration of justice and thereafter taking 
the stated factors into account to determine if he should exercise his 
discretion in favour of admitting the evidence. He should have taken 
these factors into account first in order to determine if admission of the 
evidence would have been detrimental to the administration of justice. 
In this context he would have exercised discretion. Once he answered 
this question in the affirmative, he was duty-bound to exclude the 
evidence.
It is submitted that the reasoning of Plasket J does not only fly in 
the face of the wording of s 35(5), but is also in conflict with the clear 
exposition in Schwikkard and Van der Merwe’s authoritative work 
(Principles of Evidence 215; see para 2 above) and with case law on 
this subject. In S v Tandwa (2008) 1 SACR 613 at paras 116-7 the court 
explained as follows:
‘[116] The notable feature of the Constitution’s specific exclusionary provi-
sion is that it does not provide for automatic exclusion of unconstitutionally 
obtained evidence. Evidence must be excluded only if it (a) renders the trial 
unfair; or (b) is otherwise detrimental to the administration of justice …
 [117] In determining whether the trial is rendered unfair, courts must 
take into a account competing social interests. The court’s discretion must 
be exercised ‘by weighing the competing concerns of society on the one 
hand to ensure that the guilty are brought to book against the protection 
of entrenched human rights accorded to […] accused persons’. Relevant fac-
tors include the severity of the rights violation and the degree of prejudice, 
weighed against the public policy interest in bringing criminals to book …
 [118] … [T]hough admitting evidence that renders the trial unfair will 
always be detrimental to the administration of justice, there may be cases 
when the trial will not be rendered unfair, but admitting the impugned evi-
dence will nevertheless damage the administration of justice. Central in this 
inquiry is the public interest …’ (my emphasis).
It is evident from this passage that the court exercised discretion in 
weighing the different factors so as to determine whether admission of 
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the tainted evidence would render the trial unfair or would otherwise 
be detrimental to the administration of justice. It is equally clear that 
once the court has determined that one of the stated consequences 
would ensue, it is obliged to exclude the evidence. In this event there 
is no discretion — only a duty.
6 Conclusion
Although Plasket J’s interpretation of the interaction of the different 
elements of s 35(5) was, with respect, clearly wrong, his conclusion 
regarding the admissibility of Lucas’ evidence is supported. In view 
of the severity of the infringement of accused 1’s constitutional rights 
by the anti-crime committee and the abdication of their constitutional 
responsibility by the police, admission of the tainted evidence of Lucas 
would undoubtedly have been detrimental to the administration of 
justice.
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